d ecentralized
i nternet
n ative
o rganization



WalllaW












is a D.I.N.O
Decentralized Internet Native Organization
framework that
instrumentalizes fungibility to facilitate access to
fully trustless and explainable collective efforts.
It accomplishes this by means of three low-complexity devices: inflation, majority vote and membership.


internet native


the point
is that the internet alone can sustain corporate life
without systematically depending on any one identifiable atomic party


This text is about a new type of DAO. I am unable to structure that information in a linear way.
Instead, to progress towards an acceptable form, below, I ask and answer questions as to clarify and highlight the expected and the novel of this new computer aided social structure.

DAO is an overused term with no unitary significant meaning. Leading practice (e.g. progressive decentralisation), further muddies the waters.

More importantly, the “autonomous” part of the definition is misleading. A DAO is a totalizing body of incorruptible functions. What is autonomous about it is its potential use, in that the agents that animate it by pushing its buttons can, through it, collectively act in an autonomous way. DIO (decentralized internet organisation) is easier to understand and convey. It retains and emphasises the central capability and asks of one to understand or communicate only one potentially unfamiliar concept. Autonomy is elusive and should not be an entry level concept for internet native coordination.

Another thing to consider is that I am the kind of person that feels cosy in a 3 months+ DAO structure nerd trap.
So, "just because I can" is an equally valid answer.

A DAO is a composed agent constituted for the purpose of change such that the initiation and execution of any movement does not systematically rely on the consent or input of any one identifiable atomic party.

DINO stands for Decentralized Internet Native Organization. A DINO is a multi-agent composed internet-native agency. The point being, the resulting entity, be it thought of as an organisation or organism, is internet native and capable of reproducing and surviving without external aid.

Is a type of Internet Native Organisation. WalllaW can be read as wall law and is also a palindrome like anna. I don’t know what else you would want from a name.

DAOs or DIOs or DINOs are for the materialisation of uncommon shared interests.
DAOs are for uncommon shared interests.

For profit seeking, a very common, ‘rational’’ interest and type of behaviour, you have companies, corporations.
For setting up a garden in the abandoned plot of land wasting at the end of the street; or for benefiting from the efficiency of a meal prepping service and creating the corresponding remunerated roles known as jobs, there’s really nothing that works at economic cost.
The closest thing there was: facebook groups. The thing there is, now, hopefully: DINOs (Internet Native Organisations) or DAOs or DIOs for humans to commune and coordinate asynchronously within, to the various degrees to which they share in the proposed change as in their interests, with their energy.

An alternative, more technical Definition: DAOs are membranes that can move forward.

Movement requires energy and energy is fungible, convertible, divisible and storable. Can be concentrated or diluted. Can be measured and transferred and most importantly, can explain power relations.

A membrane is a border. Something that separates or categorises.

In the context of WalllaW, membranes are a security device that determine whether an agent is or is not a member of a given DAO or subDAO. A binary determinator.
They are comprised of a required list of Tokens and Balances as a membership condition.

Only members can propose and support internal change such as inflation rate, membrane to use or the execution of externally oriented actions.

Given that it can be changed, the membrane is capable of acting as an immune organ. Or as a modularization device.

There’s new movement, there’s movement in progress and then there’s inertia. The most efficient way to move is to make use of inertia to the widest extent possible. Inflation and interest rates are forms of inertia yielding global movement. Changes in inflation rate affects the speed, intensity and coherence of lower-level, localised or specialised agents.

Another way to move is to signal out a desirable point and expend energy to get there. In WalllaW this will have to take the shape of a subDAO. Only members can spawn new subDAOs of DAOs or subDAOs of subDAOs.

Lastly, there’s calibrating movement . Movements that can change the direction, but are not new movements in the sense that their implementation and impact is fully known. While increasing an inflation rate can be compared to pressing the proverbial gas pedal, calibration movements are comparable to turning the wheel, or changing the route to the same destination. In practice, these calibration movements are member dependent budgetary allocations. Such energy allocations can be out of their “no taxation without interest materialisation” share of inflation or, through direct, un-intermediated transfers. A very interesting point here is that such in-motion energy allocations become political statements.

No proposals.

I never got paid for any proposal I ever wrote. They clearly don’t work.

Sure, they might pan out just fine for national parliaments, but they don’t seem fit for purpose, efficient or effective for internet native organisations. They’re not unavoidable, but merely an unchallenged default that seems to have sadly trickled into attempts to standardise DAOs.

For contrast, Universal Basic Income, ETH PoS yield are examples of non-retroactive funding. All other funding that is distributed on the basis of a description, application, proposal, github repository, salaried work, work, in general, is, at least in part, retroactive. Work has been done to obtain the funding, to project and sell a future state of affairs.

WalllaW accounts for this. The work starts with the contributor under the form of a new, branching out effort which can take the shape of a new sub-DAO. The metadata links to the aimed outputs, communication channels and where the work can be followed and its considerations such as potential timelines, resource requirements, contributor requirements. Fellow governance members assign resources through a coordinape-like mechanism. 1-100% of your share of deposit corresponding to inflation can be withdrawn, permissionless by the sub-dao. That’s the implemented idea.

So it’s retroactive in the sense that the work already started, is in progress. What work is not so? The difference here perhaps is that it does not mean that the initiator is obligated to do anything. It is much more the case that they need to prove themselves reliable and work very much so in public. Their work and presence on that branch is part of their identity in the specific DAO and potentially wider network. Allocations vest and inflation materialises linearly. Preferred allocations can change on a whim, with a justification or without, to the various degrees to which any actor chooses to incentivize work (change, movement, overall direction) and reward effort and accomplishments.

Holding an asset, assuming it has any exchange value, makes one a stakeholder. Proving that you hold the asset is therefore proof of stake.

An even better way to prove something at stake is to deposit and wrap x amount of X token in a governance structure that inflates its wrapper at a certain rate.

In a sense, you pay to be in that governance structure. You pay to participate and therefore, you pay to govern.

This alone is likely to generate some interesting dynamics as a whale splashing out of nowhere in the governance pool is a deflationary event and a good opportunity for others to exit at favourable terms.

At the same time there is an incentive to never enter the governance pool since that comes with a guaranteed loss versus simple token holding.

Changes in governance dynamics, power distributions will affect price.

Case 1: $MKR decentralisation rug

So, one novel capability here is that WalllaW is token agnostic. Not only you can use any ERC20 as a value base but you can use the same ERC20 as a base for an unlimited number of DAOs. Here’s a possible scenario that could unfold.

20% of $MKR holdings are deposited in a new DAO with a base inflation of 5% per year. The surplus wrapper is distributed to incentivise the development of a fully decentralised algo-stable. The new DAO defines its own membrane and workspaces. The new DAO can still vote, as a block voter in the governance of the old one. To spill it out, in actuality, the ERC20 token is the DAO. The token can spawn separate distinct entities with different work processes and possibly divergent ends that can still ultimately converge on a non-WalllaW governance process. What this sounds like is that a DAO can have decentralisation cake and eat it too.

Case 2: Street Corner Garden

There’s a plot of abandoned land at the end of the street. You’re a crypto developer. What do you do?

You create an ERC20, you airdrop 1% on 900 leaflets. You set aside one to five leaflets for you and your …future friends. You set up a WalllaW DAO with $MyStreetGarden as base value. Immutably stream into the DAO 99% of the token over the next 5 years. Sent the base inflation to 10%. Create two subDAOs ‘material acquisitions’, ‘research and labour’. And I guess wait… or go to nearby community meetings and explain what you want to do. Because let’s be real, you do want to touch soli and grow food and like, speak with people in the ‘real’ world.

Likely, there’s others out there that not only want, but would be open to supporting such a socio-economic experiment. And this is what DAOs are for. Weird, previously unimaginable institutions, initiatives and generally, would argue, resilience.




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